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Rate of Return 
Ariel Pakes 
Hebrew University  and National Bureau of Economic  Research 
Empirical work on the causes and effects of inventive activity has had 
difficulty  in  finding  measures  that  can  indicate  when  and  where 
changes  in  either  inventive  inputs  or  inventive  output  have  oc- 
curred.  The  recent computerization  of the U.S. Patent Office's data 
base may prove helpful  in this context,  but there is the problem that 
a priori we do  not  know  the  relationships  between  patent  applica- 
tions  and  economically  meaningful  measures  of  these  inputs  and 
outputs.  To  help  solve this problem,  this paper  investigates  the dy- 
namic relationships  among  the number of successful patent applica- 
tions of firms, a measure of the firm's investment in inventive activity 
(its R & D expenditures),  and an indicator of its inventive output (the 
stock market value of  the firm). 
To  date  our  understanding  of  the  role  of  invention  and  innovation  in 
economic  processes  has been  severely  hampered  by a lack of  empirical 
evidence  about  its causes  and  its effects.  In  large  part  this  reflects  the 
difficulty  in  finding  (or  constructing)  meaningful  measures  of  inven- 
tion.  Early  studies  often  used  successful  patent  applications  as  their 
output  measure  (Schmookler  and  Brownlee  1962;  Griliches  and 
Schmookler  1963;  Scherer  1965a,  1965b;  Schmookler  1966).  The  pat- 
ent  variable  had  the  advantage  of  being  a more  direct  consequence  of 
inventive  activity  than  the  other  indicators  of  performance  available 
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(examples  used  include  profits,  productivity,  and sales of  new prod- 
ucts) and the advantage  that patent applications were, at least in prin- 
ciple,  available  for  an  unusually  long  time  period  in  an  extremely 
detailed  breakdown  (by both grantee  and product  class; see U.S. De- 
partment  of  Commerce,  Patent  and  Trademark  Office,  Office  of 
Technology  and  Assessment  [1973-79]).  There  were,  however,  two 
serious problems  with the patent variable. First, though  patent counts 
were available in principle,  they were inaccessible in practice. Second, 
variation in the  number  of  patents  granted  had  no clear interpreta- 
tion. In particular, though  it is clear that patent applications should be 
granted  only when  a useful  and technologically  feasible advance  has 
been  made  (U.S.  Department  of  Commerce,  Patent and Trademark 
Office  1978) and that the patentee  expects some positive benefit from 
the patent  (since the process of application  is costly in itself), it is also 
the  case  that  technological,  institutional,  and  market  circumstances 
can cause patents to vary greatly in their economic  value, and that not 
all useful  innovations  are patented.  (For discussions  of the usefulness 
of  patent  statistics see  the exchange  between  Kuznets,  Sanders,  and 
Schmookler  in  Nelson  [1962];  Comanor  and  Scherer  [1969];  and 
more  recently  Taylor  and  Silberston  [1973].) 
The  recent  computerization  of  the  U.S.  Patent  Office's data base 
has changed  this situation. One can now obtain annual patent applica- 
tions in a variety of different  breakdowns at reasonable cost (see, e.g., 
Pakes and Griliches  1980). Thus the interpretative problem now takes 
on  renewed  importance.  That  is, in order  to use  the  patent  data to 
investigate  hypotheses  associated  with the inducements  to engage  in 
inventive  activity, the  relationship  between  inventive  inputs  and  in- 
ventive  outputs,  and  the  effects  of' those  outputs,  we require  some 
understanding  of the empirical relationships  between  patent applica- 
tions  and  the  investments  of  patentees,  and  between  those  applica- 
tions  and  an  economically  meaningful  measure  of' the  value  of  the 
inventive  outputs  the patentees  have produced. 
This  study  provides  an empirical  characterization  of  the  dynamic 
relationships  among  the number  of successful  patent applications  of' 
industrial firms, a measure of the firm's investment  in inventive activ- 
ity (its R & D expenditures),  and an indicator of its inventive  output 
(the stock market value of the firm). The  use of stock market values as 
the  output  indicator  has  one  major  advantage  in  this  context.  As 
noted  by Arrow  (1962),  the  public-good  characteristics of' inventive 
output  make  it extremely  difficult  to market.  Returns  to innovation 
are earned  mostly by embodying  it in a tangible good or service that is 
then  sold  or traded  for  other  information  that can be so embodied 
(Wilson  1975; von Hippel  1982). There  are therefore  no direct mea- 
sures  of  the  value  of  inventions,  while  indirect  measures  of  current 392  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
benefits  (such  as  profits  or  productivity)  are  likely  to  react  to  the 
output  of  the  firm's research  laboratories only slowly and  erratically 
(see the review by Griliches [1979]). On the other hand, under simpli- 
fying  assumptions,  changes  in  the  stock  market  value  of  the  firm 
should  reflect  (possibly  with  error)  changes  in  the  expected  dis- 
counted  present  value  of  the  firm's entire  uncertain  net  cash  flow 
stream.  Thus,  if  an  event  does  occur  that  causes  the  market  to 
reevaluate  the accumulated  output of the firm's research laboratories, 
its  full  effect  on  stock  market  values  ought  to  be  recorded  im- 
mediately.  This  full  effect  is, of  course,  the  expected  effect  of' the 
event on future  net cash flows and need not be equal to the effect  that 
actually  materializes.  The  fact  that  we  are  measuring  expectations 
rather than realizations,  however,  does have its advantages.  In partic- 
ular, expectations  ought  to determine  research  demand,  so that the 
use  of  stock  market  values  should  allow  us  to  check  whether  the 
interpretation  we  give  to our  parameter  estimates  is consistent  with 
the observed  behavior  of  the research expenditure  series. 
To  obtain the implications  of such considerations  this paper uses a 
variant  of  Lucas  and  Prescott's  (1971)  investment  model,  together 
with a patent indicator function,  to suggest restrictions on the stochas- 
tic process  generating  patents,  R & D, and  the  stock market  rate of 
return  on  the  firm's  equity.  These  restrictions  are  embodied  in  a 
testable  form  by approximating  both  the  patent  indicator  function 
and the function  determining  the value of the firm's R & D program. 
The  resulting  econometric  model  is a variant of  the  index  (Sargent 
and  Sims  1977)  or  dynamic-factor-analysis  (Geweke  1977)  models 
that  have  recently  been  used  to  analyze  macroeconomic  data.  The 
restrictions  imply the existence  of a particularly simple recursive sys- 
tem of equations  that summarize  and interpret the dynamic relation- 
ships among  patents,  R & D, and the stock market rate of  return. 
This recursive form is estimated  and tested on a micro data set that 
contains information  on  120 firms over an 8-year period.  The  restric- 
tions  seem  to be  consistent  with  the  observed  behavior  of' the  data, 
and the paper focuses  on the implications of the parameter estimates, 
particularly those  associated  with the interpretation  of movements  in 
the  patent  variable.  These  implications  are investigated  both  in the 
cross-section  dimension  (i.e.,  differences  in  patent  applications  be- 
tween  different  firms) and  in the  time-series  dimension  (differences 
in the patent  applications  of  a given  firm over time). 
Section  I sets out the framework  for the empirical analysis; Section 
II  provides  estimates  of' the  recursive  form  and  the  associated  test 
statistics. In  Section  III  the  implications  of  the  parameter  estimates 
are  considered  in  some  detail.  Brief' concluding  remarks  close  the 
paper. PATENTS  393 
I.  A Framework  for the  Empirical  Analysis 
The  econometric  model  to be  investigated  consists  of  equations  for 
the stock market rate of return on the firm's equity, the R & D expen- 
ditures of the firm, and the firm's patent applications.  The  equations 
determining  R & D expenditures  and the stock market rate of return 
can  be  motivated  by the  assumptions  that  management  chooses  an 
R & D program  to maximize the expected  discounted  value of the net 
cash flows (sales minus current  input costs) from its activities and that 
the  stock  market  measures  this expectation  subject to error.  (Lucas 
and  Prescott  [1971]  provide  a  more  detailed  discussion  of  similar 
assumptions.)  The  properties  of  the error  term  in the  stock market 
equation  are  derived  from  an arbitrage  condition  that ensures  that 
agents  operating  in  the  stock  market  cannot  make  excess  returns 
from  a simple  linear  trading  rule  and  the  information  contained  in 
the history of the  R & D and  stock market rate-of-return  series.  Pat- 
ent  applications  are  taken  to  be  an  indicator  of  current  and  past 
values of the inputs  and the market value of the outputs of the firm's 
R & D activity. This  form  of  the  patent  equation  reflects the  lack of 
prior information  about the nature of the relationships  between  pat- 
ents and other variables, and a desire to obtain as general an empirical 
characterization  of those relations as possible. I begin by outlining  the 
derivation of the system of equations  to be estimated,  focusing  on the 
interpretation  of the parameters  and the restrictions used to indicate 
whether this interpretation  is consistent with the observed behavior of 
the data. (More detailed  derivations  can be found  in Pakes [1981].) 
Assume  that management  chooses  a research program  (a sequence 
of random  variables determining  current and future  research expen- 
ditures, conditional  on the information  available when those expendi- 
tures  must  be  made)  to  maximize  the  expected  discounted  value  of 
the  net cash flows from  the  firm's activities, and  that non-R & D in- 
puts  can  be  adjusted  costlessly  at  the  beginning  of  each  period  to 
maximize  the profits attainable in that period.  Management's  evalua- 
tion of a given program is found  by substituting that program into the 
net cash  flow functions,  taking  the  expectation  of  the  expected  dis- 
counted  value of future  net cash flows plus current profits conditional 
on  management's  current  information  set  (fQl) and  subtracting  the 
current  cost of  the  program  (R,) from  this expectation.  Noting  that 
the current  information  set, ft,  will include  the past research expen- 
ditures  of  the  firm  (Ri, for  s  <  t) and  any other  variable known  to 
management  at the time input decisions are made that provides infor- 
mation  on  the  distribution  of  future  net cash flows, the value of  the 
program  can be written as 
~t  , 
r 
Pto  O)  =  HR  t  R  t  -  1,) 
O  R  t  2  At  -  Pt 
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where HO  provides  the expected  discounted  value of future  net cash 
flows and current  profits conditional  on current  information,  and A, 
summarizes  the effect  of  other  variables that are known  to manage- 
ment  at the  time  input  decisions  are made,  but  that are  not  in  the 
econometrician's  data set. 
Clearly, for a program to be optimal it must maximize V(fl,  I?,) with 
respect  to  Rt. That  is,  if R, is optimal  and  V*(fl,) is management's 
evaluation  of  the firm conditional  on optimal behavior,  then 
V*(f,)  =  max  V(fl,  R1)  =  H(R1,  R,_  1, R,-  2,  ,  At)  -  R,  (2) 
' t 
Note  that equation  (2) implies  that an assumption  on the  functional 
form of H(-)  and on the stochastic process generating  {At}  will suffice 
to determine  the bivariate stochastic process  generating  the value of 
the firm's R & D program and R & D itself. This implication is used in 
the empirical  analysis.' 
If the  stock market  provided  an exact  evaluation  of  the  expected 
discounted  value of the firm's future net cash flows conditional  on the 
same information  used by management,  then the 1-period excess rate 
of  return  on  the firm's equity  (capital gains plus dividends  on $1.00 
invested  in the firm minus the interest rate) would equal the percent- 
age increase in the expected  discounted  value of these net cash flows 
caused  by the  information  that accumulates  over  the  given  period; 
that is, it would  equal q* where2 
V* -  E(V*Iflt)  (3) 
We shall allow for a disturbance  in the relationship  between  the ob- 
served  1-period  rate of  return,  say qt. and q*, that is, 
qt =  q*  +  1IJt,  (4) 
I  Equation (2) follows from the Bellman condition  for this problem, and the possibil- 
ity of using it to structure the empirical relationship  between  investment  and the value 
of  the firm is noted  by Lucas and  Prescott (1971)  (see also Sargent  1978,  1979). This 
procedure  does  not  provide  direct  evidence  about  the  nature  of  the  relationship  be- 
tween  R & D and  net  cash  flows  (a topic  of  considerable  controversy;  compare,  e.g., 
Griliches [1979],  in which a distributed  lag of  R & D is used to construct a knowledge 
stock  that  enters  into  a  production  function  for  marketable  goods  and  services,  to 
Nelson  and Winter [1982] or Telser  [1982],  in which the distribution of outcomes  from 
a search process is affected  by the quantity of resources invested in research). Our focus 
here,  however,  is on  the  relationships  among  the value of  the firm itself', R & D, and 
patents;  for this the Bellman  condition  suffices. 
2  This  is a discrete-time  approximation  to a continuous-time  result.  It assumes  that 
dividends  are declared  at the beginning  of  the period  and ignores  terms equal to the 
within-period  interest earned  on dividends  per share and the within-period  interest on 
capital gains per share (see Pakes 1981). A correction  for this omission  did not change 
the empirical  results. PATENTS  395 
but shall assume  that this disturbance  is uncorrelated  with informa- 
tion that is publicly available at the beginning  of the period-in  par- 
ticular, with the history of  the  R & D and rate-of-return  series. This 
arbitrage condition  ensures  that the process  generating  Ad  does  not 
allow agents  operating  on  the  stock market to use  publicly available 
information  and  a simple  linear trading  rule to make excess  returns 
on that market, and therefore  is consistent both with several previous 
empirical  studies  (see Fama  1970; LeRoy and Porter  1981) and with 
the observed  behavior of' our data (see below).3 Since one can ensure 
that cov(qlq,,,  q*) =  0 by a normalization  that affects only the relative 
values of coefficients,  and therefore  does not affect the interpretation 
of the parameter estimates, we shall also assume this condition  in what 
follows. 
The  third equation of the model is the indicator function  for patent 
applications.  Note  that,  given  current  and  past R & D, equation  (2) 
implies  that  the  value  of' the  firm's  R & D  program  is determined 
solely by A,. To  make  patents  (P.) an error-ridden  indicator  of' cur- 
rent  and  past values  of' the  inputs  and  the  outputs  from  the  firm's 
R & D activity then,  it suffices  to specify  that 
Pt  =  P(At, A_  1, . . .R,  RK 1,  (,),  (5) 
where the disturbance  process {G.} sets the propensity  to patent, that 
is, determines  the number  of patents applied  for given the history of' 
the inputs and the market value of the outputs  from the firm's R & D 
activity. The  phrase "the propensity  to patent" is taken from Scherer 
(1965a,  1965b), who  uses it to refer  to differences  in the number  of 
patents  resulting  from  an innovation  of' a given  quality. We will as- 
sume the process generating  that propensity,  {Gt},  to be independent 
of  the  process  generating  R & D  and  the  value  of  the  firm.  These 
assumptions  provide  a  precise  interpretation  for  the  propensity  to 
patent  that will be shown  to lead to testable implications  below.' 
Note  that  the  presence  of' the  error  term,  qI,,, implies  that  there  may  be  more 
variance in stock market evaluations  than call be justihed  by the variance in  earnings 
(which accords with the  results of' LeRoy and  Porter [  19811 and Shiller [ 198 1  ]). 
Note  that  eqq.  (2)  and  (5)  assume  that  there  is  only  one  sequence  of' randomn 
variables, {A,}, which, given current and past K, tietermines  both the value of' the R & D 
program  [V*(fl,)] and,  apart from differences  in the propensity  to patent,  patents per 
se.  It is possible  to construct  a richer  model  that identifies  two factors: one  affecting 
patents only through  the R & D expenditures  it induces  (say demand  shocks) an(1 one 
having a direct effect  on patents and an indirect effect  via indduced  R & I) demand  (say 
technological  or supply shocks). For an interesting  discussion of' the implications of' the 
differences  between demand  and supply shocks see Schmookler  (1966) and Rosenberg 
(1974).  Since,  however,  the  empirical  results  indicated  that  to  distiguLish  between 
demand  and supply shocks one  requires more (and quite likely different)  data than are 
used here  (see Pakes  1981), and since eq. (5) suffices  f'or the reduced-f'orm interpreta- 
tion of movements  in the patent variable we are after, I shall concentrate on the simpler 
model,  which uses eq. (5), here. 396  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
Equations  (2),  (4), and  (5) suggest  easily interpretable  restrictions 
on the stochastic process generating  q, R, and P. To derive an explicit 
form for those restrictions,  I use a logarithmic  approximation  to H(O) 
in equation  (1) and to P(-) in (5); assume that {a, =  log At,  gt  =  log Gt, 
q ,j} evolves  as a covariance  stationary  stochastic  process  and  use  its 
moving  average  (or Wold)  representation  (see  Anderson  1971,  sec. 
7.6); and solve equation  (2) for rt =  log R,, (4) for qt, and (5) for Pt  = 
log P,. The  stochastic process generating  {qt,  rt, pt} can then be written 
explicitly  as 
qt  =  et  +  n 1 ,t 
rt =  >3  C2,Et-  ,  (6) 
T=0 
Pt  =  >3  C3,TEt  -  +X>  b3,TTq3,t  - T 
where {at},  {,jt},  and {qn3,}  are three mutually uncorrelated  white noise 
processes  (i.e.,  processes  that are serially uncorrelated  with constant 
variance), at  =  E=  aEt 
-  , gt  =  - =0  ob3,Tm3,t-  T, and b3,0  =  1. Equation 
(6) decomposes  the variance in each of the observable deviates  (in qt, 
rt, and Pt) into portions resulting  from current and past values of three 
innovations (i.e., unpredictable random variables).  That is,  et  is  the 
innovation  in a,,  3,t  is  the innovation  in gt, and, due  to our arbitrage 
condition,  -q ,t is an  innovation  in  itself.  The  three  innovations  are 
uncorrelated  with past values of all variables and are mutually uncor- 
related  as a result of the assumed  independence  of Gt from Rt and qt 
and of  the definition  of at.5 
For an intuitive  understanding  of the system in (6), note first that it 
is realizations  of  Et  (the  process  determining  at, or  the  value  of  the 
research  program)  that  cause  changes  in  rt. Now  suppose  that  an 
unexpected  research-related  event occurred during the previous time 
period that increased  the market value of the firm by 1 percent  (i.e., E 
=  1). The  returns  on holding  the firm's equity over that period  will, 
as a result,  be  1 percent  above the  market rate of return.  This  same 
event  will also cause  changes  in the firm's R & D program  and in its 
patent  applications.  Current  R & D  expenditures  will go  up  by  c2,0 
percent above what would have been predicted  for them at t -  1 (past 
E'S can be determined  from  past r's), while expected  R & D expendi- 
tures T periods ahead will go up by C2,T  percent.  Similarly patent appli- 
' The  system  in (6) ignores  any deterministic  components  in the  stochastic  process 
generating  {qt,  r1,  pj}. The  empirical  work adds time dummy  variables to all equations, 
and  these  should  pick up any deterministic  components  that exist. PATENTS  397 
cations  X periods  ahead  will go up by C3,T percent.  A realization on al 
equal to, say, X is noise in the sense that it never (either currently or in 
the future) affects p or r, while a realization of T3  =  X will never affect 
either research expenditures  or the value of the firm and in this sense 
can be interpreted  as a change  in the  propensity  to patent  given  the 
inputs  and  the outputs  of  the firm's R & D activities. 
II.  Test  Statistics  and  Parameter  Estimates 
Formally the econometric  model  given  by equation  (6) is a restricted 
version  of  a dynamic-factor-analysis  (Geweke  1977) or an unobserv- 
able index  (Sargent and Sims 1977) model.  The name is a result of the 
fact that in (6) there is a single stochastic process, built up from the E, 
that accounts  for  all the  observed  correlations  between  current  and 
past values  of  the  components  of  yt  =  (qt, rt, pt). This  provides  the 
empirical  interpretation  to realizations  of  Ti3 and T  1; Ti3 stems  from 
differences  in patenting  that are never associated with differences  in 
the  value  of  the  firm or in the  firm's R & D program;  and  qi  stems 
from movements  in the stock market value of the firm that are never 
associated with its R & D program  or its patents. The  model  in equa- 
tion (6) is more restricted than the general index model.  In particular, 
it constrains  qt to be  a function  of  only  current  values  of  E  and  T1i. 
Since the history of E and  I can be predicted  from the history of y, the 
implication  this constraint  is testing is that realizations of qt  cannot be 
predicted  from the history of the variables in our data set. In addition 
the  system  in  (6)  does  not  allow  a  separate  stochastic  process  that 
affects r but does not affect p or q (all the variance in r is accounted  for 
by current  and  past values of E, or there is no measurement  error in 
r). This assumption  was maintained  because the empirical results indi- 
cated that there was no need  to allow for such a measurement  error.6 
The  restrictions  embodied  in  (6)  allow  for  relatively  straightfor- 
ward estimation  and  testing  procedures.  This  results  from  the  fact 
that the system in (6) has a recursive form, in which all restrictions are 
exclusion  restrictions,  and  which,  by  its  recursive  nature,  permits 
equation-by-equation  estimation  techniques.  This  recursive form  has 
qt  as a function  of the history of yt, rt as a function  of qt  and the history 
of yt, and pt as a function  of qt,  rt, and the history of yt, We now provide 
and estimate  each of  the equations  of  this recursive  form. 
6 See Pakes (1981).  This  finding  is comforting  in a slightly different  context,  since it 
indicates that once one  moves away from measuring  the effects  of R & D via its impact 
on indirect measures of current benefits, there is less need to worry about measurement 
error  in  the  R & D  series  (see  Griliches  [1979]  for  the  importance  of  measurement 
error  in studies  designed  to measure  the contribution  of  R & D to productivity). 398  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
TABLE  1 
TESTS  OF  THE  UNPREDICTABILITY  OF  q,:  TEST  STATISTICS  FOR JOINT  SIGNIFICANCE 
INCLUDED  IN  THE  EQUATION: 
FOUR  LAGGED  TEST  q  r, p  q, r, p 
VALUES  OF:  STATISTIC  (1)  (2)  (3) 
q  F4  .11*  n.i.  .44* 
r  F4  n.i.  1.82*  2.00* 
p  n.i.  .40*  .32* 
r, p  F8  n.r.  1.49t  1.56t 
r, p,  q  F12  n.r.  n.r.  1.(9: 
NOTE.-There  are 480  observations  (120  firms over 4 years). Time  duininies  are included  in all equiations. "Not 
included" and  "not relevant" are denoted  n.i. and n.r. 
* Critical values are 2.39  and  3.36  at 5 anld 1 percent,  respectively. 
t Critical values are  1.96 and 2.55  at 5 and  1 percent,  respectively. 
Critical values are  1.78 and 2.23  at 5 and  1 percent,  respectively. 
The  data used  here  contain  the successful  patent applications,  the 
R & D expenditures,  and the annual  rates of' return on the stocks of' 
120 firms over an 8-year period  (1968-75).  The  sample of firms and 
the  method  of  constructing  the  patent  and  R & D variables are dis- 
cussed  in Pakes and  Griliches  (1984).  The  observations  on  the  stock 
market rates of  return  were  taken from  the  1975 Master File of  the 
University  of  Chicago's  Center  for  Research  in  Security  Prices 
(CRSP). I use the rates of return in the year before  the R & D expendi- 
tures  and  patent  applications  were  made.  This  is a result of  the  as- 
sumption  that decisions  on r and p are made at the beginning  of the 
year; as we shall see below, this assumption  is supported  by the data. 
The  leading  equation  of  the  recursive  form  has q as a function  of' 
lagged  values  of  itself,  r,  and  p.  The  model  predicts  that  neither 
component  of q (E or  ql) can be predicted  by a linear combination  of' 
these variables, or that agents cannot make excess returns on the stock 
market from a linear trading  rule based on the history of y,. Table  1 
presents  test statistics for  this hypothesis.  Column  1 shows  that it is 
reasonable  to assume  that q, cannot  be predicted  from past values of' 
itself, column  2 that it cannot be predicted  from past values of' r or p, 
and column  3 that it cannot be predicted  f'ronm  past values of itself', r, 
or p. Thus  rates of return do seem to represent  unpredictable  move- 
ments  in the value of the firm, or at least movements  that cannot  be 
predicted  with the variables in our data set. 
To obtain the recursive form of the r, equation,  first note that Ea  can 
be written as 
Et  =O  qt +  vit,  (7) 
where 0 =  (J2/C.2;  that is, 0 is the signal-to-total-variance  ratio in q, and 
Vt  =  (1  -  O)E,  -  O-l l,t. It follows that v, is uncorrelated  with q, and with PATENTS  399 
past values of all variables. Next,  assuming that there is an autoregres- 
sive representation  for  the  r, equation,  we obtain  it as rt  =  C2(et  + 
d2(L)rt- 1, where,  here  and  in the  discussion  below,  a function  of  L 
represents  a  polynomial  in  the  lag  operator  and  c2(L)  c2,41  - 
d2(L)]  '.7 Substituting  (7) into the autoregressive  form of the r, equa- 
tion, we obtain 
rt =  c2,(0qt +  d2(L)r_,  -  +  C2,0V1  (8) 
Note  that the  variance  of  the  disturbance  in equation  (8) is orc2,( 41 
-  0)0, so  that  (together  with  the  first coefficient  and  a  )  it can  be 
used  to identify  0 and therefore  C2,0. 
Equation  (8) is reminiscent  of  Grunfeld's  (1960)  investment  equa- 
tion. Grunfeld  used  stock market evaluations  to proxy  for the effect 
of  unobservable  expectations  on  investment  (Lucas  and  Prescott 
[1971]  provide  a more  rigorous justification  for  this procedure).  In 
equation  (8) revisions  in stock market evaluations  (i.e., q,) are used to 
proxy  for  the  effect  of  factors that caused  revisions  in the  expected 
discounted  value of the firm's R & D program. This allows us to iden- 
tify the time pattern of the relationship  among changes  in the market 
value of  the  firm's R & D  program,  patents,  and  R & D itself'. Note 
also  that  since  vt is uncorrelated  with q, and  with  past values  of  all 
variables,  equation  (8)  implies  that  in  a  regression  of' r, on  q, and 
lagged  values of all variables (which, recall, is the second  equation  of 
the  recursive  form),  all the  coefficients  but  those  on  current  q and 
lagged  r should  be close  to zero. 
The  recursive form of the Pt equation is obtained by multiplying the 
last equation  in the system in (6) through  by b3(L)  '  1 -  dm,(L)  and 
making the substitution  E1  c2(L)  -r,.  This  implies  that 
Pt =  y(L)r, +  d3(L)p1,-  +  Ti,,,  (9) 
where  y(L) =  c3(L)c2(L)- '[1  -  d3(L)]. Since  J is uncorrelated  with 
current q and r and past values of all variables, the model  implies that 
in a regression of pt on qt,  rt, and lagged values of all variables (which is 
the last equation of the recursive form), all the q coefficients  should be 
close to zero. 
Table 2 presents the results. The  unrestricted  autoregressive  forms 
of  these  equations  (the  form  that  has r and p as a function  of' only 
lagged  values  of  all variables) have been  presented  for comparison, 
while  the  relevant  test  statistics are  presented  at the  bottom  of' the 
7That  is, d2(L) =  E  dA=  (2,,L  , where Lx,  = x,- k.  I assume that.  the roots  ofhe  polyno- 
mial equations associated with c2(L)  and b:(L) all lie outside the unit circle. This ensures 
the existence  of a convergent  autoregressive  representation  for the r, and  p, eq  uatioIS 
(see Anderson  197 1, sec. 5.7). I  .:  _  _  _  _  _  _ 
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table. Beginning  with the R & D equation  (col. 1) one finds two rather 
striking  implications  of  the  estimates.  First, the  events  leading  the 
market  to  reevaluate  the  firm are  indeed  highly  and  positively  cor- 
related  with  the  events  leading  the  firm to change  its R & D  policy 
from  what  would  have  been  predicted  given  the  firm's observable 
history (i.e., the history of yt). There  is really no doubt on this point, as 
the coefficient  of qt  is large and estimated with great precision. Equally 
striking  is  the  fact  that  we  can  be  quite  sure  that  each  of  the 
coefficients  of  the  lagged  p variables in this equation  is very close  to 
zero (once again all of the estimates are near zero and their standard 
errors are small; see also test T2 of this col.). Thus once we account for 
-he influence  of past r and current and past q, the additional informa- 
tion in movements  in past p is information  that never  affects  R & D 
expenditures.  This  is confirmation  of  our  interpretation  of  the  q3,t 
process as differences  in the propensity  to patent  for a given  history 
of  the firm's R & D program,  since changes  in it do not affect  r. 
The  only  implication  of  the  model,  then,  that is not strongly  sup- 
ported  by  the  estimates  of  column  1 is the  zero  restriction  on  the 
lagged  q coefficients.  The  relevant test statistic here is T3 of column  2, 
which is significant at the 5 percent  but not the  1 percent  level. Addi- 
tional  results,  which  will  not  be  discussed  here,  indicated  that  we 
observe  marginally  significant  lagged  q coefficients  because  the  as- 
sumption  that the  process  generating  rj has a low-order  autoregres- 
sive representation  is questionable.  Since this is a technical  problem 
and since correcting  for it did not change any of the basic implications 
of  the  parameter  estimates,  we shall ignore  it below  and  accept  the 
column  3 estimates  for the rt equation.8 
The  parameter  estimates  from  the  patent  equation  make  it clear 
that current  and  past changes  in R & D (past changes  only  in col. 5) 
have  a  significant  effect  on  changes  in  current  patent  applications 
(test  TI). Though  this  was  perhaps  to  be  expected  (see  Pakes  and 
Griliches  1980),  what  is  more  surprising  is that  once  the  effect  of 
R & D  expenditures  on  patent  applications  is  taken  care  of,  other 
factors leading  to a change  in the market's evaluation  of the firm are 
not correlated with patent applications  (test Tj). In particular, all the q 
coefficients  in the p equation  are near zero, and this leads us to accept 
the  interpretation  of  the  error  in the  regression  of pt on  the  rT  as 
differences  in the propensity  to patent, given the market value of the 
output  of  the firm's current  and  past research  expenditures. 
An  omnibus  test  of  the  model's  restrictions  can  be  obtained  by 
comparing  the  likelihoods  of  the  restricted  and  the  unrestricted  re- 
cursive  system of  equations.  The  observed  value of  the x25/25 likeli- 
8 More details on these  points  can be found  in Pakes (1981). 402  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
hood  ratio test statistic for the null hypothesis  embodied  in the mod- 
el's  assumptions  was  1. 15,  which  is  not  too  different  from  the 
expected  value  of  X25/25 deviate  (0.97)  and certainly  not  surprising 
(the 5 percent  critical test value is 1.51). Since the assumptions  of the 
model  seem  to be consistent  with the observed  behavior of the data,9 
we now go on to explore  the implications of the parameter estimates 
in greater  detail. 
III.  Some  Implications  of the  Parameter 
Estimates 
I begin with the implications of the estimates for the interpretation  of' 
movements  in q and r. Noting  that uq  =  0.10  and using the parame- 
ters of the R & D equation,  we find a 0 (u,/q)  of 0.05. That is, about 5 
percent  of  the within-period  variance in the rate of return  is caused 
by events  that  also  cause  changes  in both  R & D  expenditures  and 
patent applications. '0 A 0 of 0.05  implies that C2,0  (=  arlaE,)  =  2.60. 
This  implies  that a  1 percent  increase  in R & D expenditures  above 
what would  have been  predicted  from  past information  is associated 
with events  that have caused  an increase  in the value of  the  firm of' 
0.39  percent.  Evaluating  derivatives  at the means of all variables, we 
find that a $100  unexpected  increase  in R & D is associated  with re- 
search and patent-related  events that have increased  the value of the 
firm by  $1,870."1  Recall  that  the  results  implied  that  there  was no 
need to allow for measurement  error in R & D (see Sec. II), so that all 
unpredictable  changes  in R & D have this interpretation.  The  unex- 
pected  increase  in patents  is C3,E  ,  +  3,  where,  from the estimates, 
C3,0  =  1.56. Thus,  events  that lead  to a unit increase  in E result in a 
1.56 percent  increase  in successful  patent  applications.  Much of  the 
variance  in the  unexpected  change  in the  patent  variable (about 94 
9 To  ensure  the  robustness  of  this conclusion  with respect to the statistical assump- 
tions,  the tests of the  recursive  form  were also run, using  first differences  (instead of 
levels) of the r and p series, using weighted  r and p series where the weight for a given 
firm was the square root of the mean R & D expenditures  of that firm over the sample 
period,  and  allowing  the  coefficients  of  the  recursive  form  to differ  in the  different 
years  of  the  sample.  None  of' the  resulting  test  statistics indicated  rejection  of' the 
model's assumptions.  There  was, however, an indication that some of the coefficients  in 
the recursive form were not stable over time, though  the economic  implications of the 
intertemporal  differences  in these  coefficients  were minor. 
10  The  firms in our  sample  are all rather large (the average value of their common 
shares is $1,514  million) and diversified,  and they do a great deal of  research. 
" The  means  reported  here  are  sample  means;  i.e.,  they  are  calculated  over  all 
observations  (N firms and T years) and thus require the use of price deflators. The  CPI 
was used to deflate stock market values, and the R & D deflator discussed in Pakes and 
Griliches (1984)  was used  for R & D expenditures.  The  base year for these deflators is 
1972, so all dollar figures  in the  text are in  1972 dollars. PATENTS  403 
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percent)  is noise,  so that we find that a  1 percent  increase  in patents 
will, again  on  average,  reflect  only  a 0.044  percent  increase  in  the 
market value of the firm; alternatively, one additional patent indicates 
that  events  have  occurred  that  increase  the  firm's market  value  by 
$810,000.  The  estimates  imply,  then,  that  although  unexpected 
changes  in patents  are a very noisy indicator of  unexpected  changes 
in  the  market  value  of  the  firm's  R & D  program,  on  average,  an 
increase  of  one  patent  is  associated  with  large  changes  in  market 
value. 
Figure  1 presents  the  estimates  of  the distributed  lags from  E to r 
(labeled  cAT])  and  from  E  to p (c3[T]);  while  figure  2  presents  the 
distributed lags from r top  (y*[T],  where  'y*[T]  =  C3[T]C2[T]  -  1) and from 
Ti3 to p (b3[T]).  Figure  1 makes it clear that the events that change  the 
market value of a firm's research program  have a persistent effect  on 
both  patents  and  R & D  expenditures.  As  a result  interfirm  differ- 
ences in R & D expenditures  are quite stable over time, and if we are 
seeking  their causes we should  look for factors in the firm's environ- 
ment whose effects  are likely to persist. On the other hand, the small 
changes  that do  occur  in  the  firm's R & D expenditures  are almost 
entirely determined  by recent events. Thus  events that occurred  over 
3 years earlier will have essentially the same effect on rt as on rt- 1 and 
cannot cause differences  between  them.  The  estimate of' c3Q) is simi- 
lar to that of c2(T),  except  that the effect  of' the E on p tends to increase 
before  declining,  giving  the  impression  that p reacts to the  E a little 
more slowly than r does.  Thus,  moving to figure 2, we see that patent 404  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
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applications  follow  the  factors  determining  the  productivity  of' cur- 
rent  R & D expenditures  (and hence  R & D demand)  quite closely. 
The  sum of the coefficients  in the distributed lag from r to p is 1.18, 
implying  that  the  events  leading  to  a  1 percent  increase  in  R & D 
expenditures  will, eventually,  lead  to a  1.18 percent  increase  in pat- 
ented  innovations.  About  50 percent  of these  patents will be applied 
for in the same year as the R & D expenditures  are incurred, while 70 
percent will be applied  for within 3 years. In fact, if from c2(T) one gets 
the impression  that events that cause unexpected  changes in the value 
of  a  firm's  R & D  program  start  a  chain  reaction  leading  to  more 
R & D expenditures  far  into  the  future,  then  'y*(T)  seems  to be  de- 
scribing a situation  where  firms patent around  the links of this chain 
almost as quickly as they are completed.  There  is also a long,  slim tail 
of the distributed  lag from r to p, which probably represents  the effect 
of  the  basic research  done  in  the  past on  current  patented  innova- 
tions. 12 
12  The  reader is cautioned  not to interpret  the distributed lag from R & D to patents as 
representing  a production-type  relationship  between  past R & D and  patentable  out- 
put.  The  estimates  presented  here  do  not  distinguish  the  direct  effect  of  R & D on 
patents  from  the effect  of changes  in the value of the firm's R & D program  (in a,) on 
R & D and patents (this is the dynamic analogue  of the classical simultaneous  equations 
problem  discussed  in Marschak and Andrews  [1944]).  The  estimate of  y*(L) is similar PATENTS  405 
The  estimates  of g(T)  indicate that interfirm differences  in the pro- 
pensity  to  patent  are  not  as stable over  time  as one  might  have ex- 
pected.  Thus,  recalling  that gt is the propensity  to patent  (g, =  I'0 
b3,q  3,  -T)  we find that the correlation of gt and gt-T  is only about .75 for 
v  =  1, going  down to around  .6 forv=  2, 3, and 4, and decaying  at a 
fairly constant  rate of  .9 thereafter. 
A question  of general  interest is: How closely related to differences 
in the outputs  and the inputs of the firm's inventive  activity are mea- 
sures  based  on  the  recently  computerized  U.S.  Patent  Office's  data 
base likely  to  be? The  data  suggest  that some  differences  in patent 
applications  are  close  approximations  to  differences  in  these  vari- 
ables, while others  are not. 
First, consider  constructing  a cross section of patent applications by 
firm in order  to study the causes of interfirm differences  in inventive 
output  (or their effects).  The  estimates indicate that 76 percent of the 
interfirm  variance  in patents  is caused  by the  E,  that is, by research- 
related  events  that  cause  changes  in  the  market  value  of  the  firm, 
while the remainder  is noise  (not related to either the firm's research 
program  or  its  value).  If  one  were  to  ask  what  proportion  of  the 
variance  in pt is caused  by the  events  determining  current  research 
demand,  the  answer  would  be  a  little  less,  but  not  much.  To  see 
this, consider  the projection  of pt onto rt, that is, Pi =  4rt  +  g,  where 
cov(4,  rt)  =  Appropriate  calculations  indicate  that  4  =  1.12, 
while var(4rt)/var(pt)  =  0.74.  A 1 percent  difference  in Rt will, there- 
fore,  be associated  with a  1.12 percent  difference  in patent  applica- 
tions,  while  about  74  percent  of  the  interfirm  variance  in Pt can be 
attributed  to interfirm  variance in rt. Inverting  these calculations one 
finds that, on average,  a 1 percent  difference  in current  patent appli- 
cations is associated with factors that have led to a 0.66 percent differ- 
ence in Rt;'4 this implies that (on evaluating  derivatives at the sample 
means  of  all variables), a difference  of  one  patent  is associated  with 
events  that, on average,  are associated  with a $304,000  difference  in 
current  R & D activity. 
Unfortunately,  intrafirm  differences  in patent  applications  do not 
seem  to be as good  an indicator  of  intrafirm differences  in inventive 
output  as interfirm differences.  The  proportion  of the variance in pit 
-  pit-  1 caused  by the  E  is about  8 percent,  with 45  percent  of this 8 
percent  caused  by  research-related  and  patent-related  events  that 
changed  the  market  value  of  the  firm  in  the  given  period  (by  E,). 
to what Zvi Griliches and  I, in joint  preliminary  work, suggest  as a likely form for this 
lag structure  (Pakes and  Griliches  1980). 
3  Here  +  =  YcC,(T)'y*(T)/cr(0),  where  CH(T)  =  cov(r1, r, -)  and  y*(T)  is the  Tth lag 
coefficient  in the distributed  lag from  r to p. 
l  That  is, r,  =  a'p, +  gY, where  cov(g7",  p,)  =  0, and +'  = 0.66. 406  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
These  ratios  do,  however,  increase  significantly  when  one  takes 
intrafirm  differences  in  patent  applications  that  are  farther  apart. 
The proportion of the variance in Pit -  Pit -5  caused by the E is  15 
percent,  with over  75 percent  caused  by events  that occurred  during 
the 5-year period.  For 10-year differences  the figures move to over 20 
and 85 percent,  respectively.  Thus  if one were to use intrafirm differ- 
ences  in patent  applications  to study the effect  of changes  in a firm's 
inventive  output  on,  say, its investment  policy or its share of a given 
market, then  one  ought,  probably, to stick to longer-term  changes  in 
all variables. 
IV.  Concluding  Remarks 
Empirical work on the causes and the effects  of inventive  activity has 
had difficulty  in finding  variables that can indicate  when  and where 
changes  have occurred  either  in the  inducements  to invest in inven- 
tive activity or in inventive  output.  The  recent computerization  of the 
U.S. Patent Office's data base may provide  some help in this context, 
but there is the problem  that a priori one does not know the relation- 
ship between  successful  patent  applications  and economically  mean- 
ingful  measures  of  these  inputs  and  outputs.  To  provide  a  partial 
answer  to  this question,  this  paper  investigated  the  relationship  be- 
tween successful  patent applications,  a measure of the inputs into the 
inventive process (R & D expenditures),  and a variable that provides a 
measure of, among other diverse factors, the value of the output from 
this  process  (movements  in  the  stock  market  value  of  the  firm's 
equity).  The  assuniptions  that  management  chooses  an  R & D  pro- 
gram to maximize the expected  discounted  value of the net cash flows 
from the firm's activities, that the stock market measures this expecta- 
tion subject to error, and that patents are an error-ridden  measure of 
current  and  past  values  of  the  inputs  to  and  the  outputs  from  the 
firm's R & D activity were used to suggest  a testable interpretation  of 
the dynamic relationships  among  the three observable variables. This 
interpretation  seemed  consistent  with  the  observed  behavior  of  the 
data, and  the qualitative  nature  of  the empirical  results can be sum- 
marized quite succinctly. 
First, it is clear that the events that lead the market to reevaluate the 
firm are indeed  significantly correlated  with unpredictable  changes  in 
both the R & D and the patents  of the firm. Moreover,  the estimates 
imply that, on average,  unexpected  changes  in patents and in R & D 
are  associated  with  quite  large  changes  in  the  market  value  of  the 
firm.  Nevertheless,  there  is a large  variance  to  the  increases  in the 
value of  the  firm that are associated  with a given  increase  in its pat- 
ents.  This  may  reflect  an  extremely  dispersed  distribution  of  the PATENTS  407 
values  of  patented  ideas.  Further,  most of  the  variance in the  stock 
market  rate  of  return  has  little  to  do  with  the  firm's inventive  en- 
deavors, at least as measured  by its R & D input and its patent output. 
However,  once appropriate  disturbances are allowed for, the observa- 
tions  on  the  stock  market  rate  of  return  do  seem  to  enable  us  to 
separate  out  the  time  pattern  of  the  impacts  of  events  that  cause 
changes  in the  value  of  a firm's R & D program  (movements  in the 
stock market  rate of  return  do  seem  to be a result of  unpredictable 
events,  and stock market evaluations  should  not depend  on the long 
and erratic lag structure  between  invention  and the current  benefits 
derived  from  it). 
The  events that do cause the market to reevaluate the firm's inven- 
tive  endeavors  have  long-lasting  effects  on  both  the  patents  and 
R & D expenditures  of the firm. On the other hand, the effects of the 
factors  that cause  differences  in the  propensity  to  patent  are much 
more transient.  These  timing  patterns have several implications. The 
large  differences  in  the  patent  applications  of  different  firms  are 
mostly associated  with differences  in the market's evaluations  of dif- 
ferences  in the firms' inventive  output.  However,  the smaller differ- 
ences  that occur  in the  patent  applications  of a given  firm over time 
are due  largely to differences  in the propensity  to patent. Of course, 
some  information  is still in the  time-series  dimension.  If we were to 
observe,  for example,  a sudden  burst in the  patent applications  of  a 
given firm, we could be quite sure that events have occurred to cause a 
large change  in the  market value of  its R & D program;  but smaller 
changes  in the patent applications  of a given firm are not likely to be 
very informative.  This  latter statement  must  be modified  somewhat 
when we consider  long-term  differences  in the patents of a given firm 
(say differences  over  a 5- or  10-year interval), as a larger portion  of 
their variance is caused  by events  that lead the market to reevaluate 
the firm's inventive  output  during  these  periods. 
The  timing  of  the  impact  of  the  events  that  cause  unexpected 
changes  in the market value of a firm's inventive activity on patents is 
very close to the timing of their impact on R & D. In fact one gets the 
impression  from  the  estimates  that an event  that causes a  1 percent 
change  in the market value of a firm's inventive activity starts a chain 
reaction leading to more R & D expenditures  far into the future,  with 
the  firm patenting  around  the  links of  this chain  almost  as soon  as 
they are completed.  These  timing  patterns imply that current  patent 
applications are highly correlated with current R & D demand.  In this 
context  it should  be noted  that R & D itself is generally  not available 
by product  field,  for  smaller  business  concerns  or, before  1972,  for 
most  large  business  enterprises.  The  availability of  the  patent  data 
together  with some  of  the qualitative  results presented  here  should, 408  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
therefore,  allow us to study the causes and effects of R & D activity in 
a much wider variety of situations,  and in more detail, than has been 
possible  to date.  To  use patent  and  R & D data jointly  to distinguish 
between  the different  kinds of events that can cause changes in inven- 
tive activity (say demand  shocks  vs. technological  or supply  shocks), 
and then isolate their impacts on behavior and performance,  seems to 
require a larger, and perhaps more detailed,  model than the one used 
here. 
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